With the recently announced reform package, Kazakhstan has entered a new, defining phase of constitutional transformation, which goes far beyond routine legislative amendments. The planned reform should be understood as a continuation and deepening of the 2022 constitutional changes, but also as an attempt to redesign the institutional logic of the state after a period of acute political stress. The scale of the proposed changes is actually comparable to a new constitution. The significance of the reform lies primarily in its strategic intent.
The declared formula of “Strong President – Influential Parliament – Accountable Government” reflects a conscious effort to preserve presidential authority, a strong presidential republic, while embedding it in a more structured system of checks and balances. This approach responds to both domestic lessons learned from the January 2022 unrest and international expectations regarding governance, stability, and predictability.
The proposed transition to a unicameral parliament, which will be renamed the Kurultay, is one of the most symbolic and institutionally significant elements of the reform. The choice of name itself builds on the historical traditions of collective popular representation, while the essence of the reform aims to strengthen parliamentarism in a system that has long been dominated by the executive branch. The expansion of the parliament’s powers in appointing members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Audit Chamber, and the Central Election Commission, as well as its role in judicial appointments, is a meaningful attempt to institutionalize political accountability and oversight. Comparatively, this brings Kazakhstan closer to international constitutional practice, even if the presidential nature of the system remains firmly intact. For Hungarian observers, the reform inevitably requires comparison with Hungary’s own constitutional experience. Hungary’s political system, as a parliamentary republic, limits executive power through parliamentary accountability and constitutional review. Kazakhstan’s reform is not structurally moving in this direction; instead, it seeks to discipline the dominance of the executive through stronger institutions, not by changing the type of regime. This difference is crucial. Kazakhstan is not converging towards a Central European parliamentary model, but is developing a unique hybrid that reflects its political culture, elite structure, regional traditions, political cultural needs, and historical trajectory. In this sense, the reform adopts institutional tools familiar in Europe—constitutional judiciary, strengthened parliamentary oversight, consultative mechanisms—while embedding them in a presidential framework adapted to Eurasian realities.
The electoral dimension of the reform further illustrates this controlled approach to political development. The proportional representation system introduced in parliamentary elections strengthens the role of political parties and enhances their formal accountability to voters. At the same time, the lack of independent candidates at the national level ensures that political competition remains structured and manageable. This construction thus prioritizes stability and predictability over pluralism. It reduces the risk of fragmentation, but it also limits the emergence of truly alternative political forces.
From the perspective of democratic development, the reform creates both opportunities and constraints. On the one hand, the expansion of parliamentary power, the institutionalization of public consultation, and the constitutional recognition of digital rights represent clear steps towards modern governance. The proposed establishment of the Kazakh People’s Council as a national consultative body could further contribute to a structured dialogue between the state and society, especially in a multi-ethnic and regionally diverse country. On the other hand, historical experience in Central Europe warns of caution: institutions alone do not guarantee democratic practice. Without political autonomy and consistent implementation, even well-designed constitutional mechanisms may remain largely symbolic.
At the international level, constitutional reform significantly strengthens Kazakhstan’s political narrative. In the eyes of the European Union and especially Hungary, Kazakhstan appears as a reform-oriented, pragmatic partner, capable of gradual adaptation without destabilization. In the current geopolitical environment - characterized by war, sanctions and systematic rivalry - this situation has real strategic value. Constitutional reform thus functions not only as a domestic policy tool, but also as a foreign policy tool, strengthening Kazakhstan's profile as a responsible and predictable middle power in Eurasia.
The reforms must therefore be assessed in a sober and realistic way. This is not just optical tuning, but a serious attempt at institutional modernization aimed at strengthening state capacity, restoring legitimacy, and managing political participation in a controlled manner. Kazakhstan is not abandoning its presidential republic; it is seeking to consolidate it through institutions. Whether this process ultimately paves the way for deeper political pluralism or stabilizes a sophisticated form of directed governance depends not only on constitutional declarations but also on political practice.
